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I. INTRODUCTION 
This saga begins with an Idaho couple—Mike and Chantell Sack-
ett—small business owners from Bonner County, Idaho, who dreamt one 
day they would live in a home they personally built.1 In 2007, not long 
after the Sacketts began construction of their house, the Sacketts’ 
dream was put on hold when Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
officials visited their property.2 EPA officials informed the Sacketts that 
their property contained a wetland and that construction of their home 
violated the Clean Water Act (CWA).3 In EPA’s pursuit of enforcement, 
                                                     
 
 1. See Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1370 (2012) (discussing 
the Supreme Court’s decision, which held that administrative compliance orders are judicial-
ly reviewable under the Administrative Procedures Act). 
 2. See id.  
 3. Id. at 1368. 
66 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [VOL. 50 
 
it issued an administrative compliance order directing the Sacketts to 
restore their property according to the compliance order or face mone-
tary penalties in the thousands for every day they failed to comply.4 Be-
lieving their property did not contain a wetland, the Sacketts brought 
suit against EPA under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).5 After 
four long years of litigation, the United States Supreme Court decided to 
hear the Sacketts’ case.6 On March 21, 2012, with a 9-0 decision, the 
Court ruled in the Sacketts’ favor holding that the Sacketts and land-
owners everywhere have a right to direct and meaningful judicial review 
of administrative compliance orders.7 
EPA’s enforcement power is not new. For four decades, EPA had 
tremendous, broad power abating and controlling pollution, and ensur-
ing compliance with pollution preventing measures. 8  EPA has been 
“strong-arm[ing]” parties, big and small, into compliance since its incep-
tion in the 1970s.9 Furthermore, EPA has significant “resources, tre-
mendous statutory authority, prosecutorial discretion, and judicial def-
erence.”10 However, with the Supreme Court’s decision in Sackett, EPA’s 
considerable enforcement power has been largely halted, and its prima-
ry enforcement mechanism—the administrative compliance order—is 
being questioned.11 
In light of the decision in Sackett, this article will attempt to an-
swer the following questions: Will EPA continue to issue administrative 
compliance orders? If so, how will administrative compliance orders be 
utilized by EPA? Alternatively, will EPA resort to less formal communi-
cations, such as notices of violations (NOVs), to ensure compliance? If 
so, will NOVs trigger judicial review under the APA? 
This article will begin by briefly outlining the historical background 
of EPA and the CWA. To understand the future of EPA’s enforcement 
power, it is also necessary to understand where EPA and the CWA came 
from. Second, this article will set forth EPA’s enforcement scheme and 
general enforcement mechanisms under all major federal environmental 
                                                     
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. at 1371. 
 7. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1368. 
 8. Letter from Richard Nixon, President, U.S., to Congress, U.S. (July 9, 1970), 
available at http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/reorganization-plan-no-3-1970 (in which Nixon 
addressed Congress in 1970 and charged EPA with “protecting the environment by abating 
pollution.”).  
 9. See Kathleen Hartnett White, The EPA’s Overreach Problem, PRARIEPUNDIT 
(May 2, 2012), http://prairiepundit.blogspot.com/2012/05/epas-overreach-problem.html. 
 10. Lowell Rothschild, Despite Sackett Ruling, Industry Still Faces Challenges with 
EPA in Permitting and Enforcement Matters, ENERGY L. BLOG (July 19, 2012, 9:16 AM), 
http://www.energylegalblog.com/archives/2012/07/19/4014.  
 11. See Richard E. Glaze Jr., A Detailed Look at the Effects of Sackett v. EPA on 
Administrative Enforcement Orders, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. 11030, 11036 (2012) (arguing that 
Sackett “will give EPA the incentive to ensure evidence in the record that supports an ACO 
is sufficient to withstand judicial review, thereby reducing the potential for issuing orders 
not supported by the facts.”).  
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statutes. Third, enforcement mechanisms under the CWA will be exam-
ined, with a focus on administrative penalties, civil enforcement actions, 
and administrative compliance orders. Next, this article will set forth 
the facts and procedural history of Sackett, the circuit split prior to 
Sackett, a history of pre-enforcement review, and the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Sackett. The Sackett test must be wholly understood in order 
to comprehend the future of EPA enforcement mechanisms. Lastly, a 
list of recommendations will be offered for EPA to implement with a fo-
cus on two alternative actions EPA could consider taking: (1) continuing 
to issue administrative compliance orders so long as they are altered to 
not trigger the final agency action test laid out in Bennett v. Spear;12 
and (2) exercising other possible enforcement mechanisms that satisfy 
the final agency action test set forth in Bennett v. Spear. The analysis 
portion of this article sets forth these alternative actions and provides 
empirical data on the status of post-Sackett EPA enforcement, but addi-
tional data as to what EPA is doing is further required to understand 
the true scope and impact of Sackett. 
II. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT: A BRIEF HISTORY 
In order to understand the Supreme Court’s decision in Sackett, 
the full effect of Sackett on EPA administrative compliance orders, and 
the future of enforcement mechanisms under EPA, it is necessary to dis-
cuss the EPA and the CWA and where they both began. This section of 
the article will first set forth a brief history of EPA: its origin, purpose, 
goals, means of enforcement, and broad power over pollution abatement. 
And second, this section will discuss the creation of the CWA and how it 
has become the principal statute in regulating water pollution within 
the United States. 
When Congress created EPA in 1970, America was just opening its 
eyes to the seriousness of its pollution problem. According to the agency, 
EPA was established: 
[As] part of the response to growing public concern and a grass 
roots movement to “do something” about the deteriorating condi-
tions of water, air, and land. For years, raw sewage, industrial 
and feedlot wastes had been discharged into rivers and lakes 
without regard for the cumulative effect that made our waters 
unfit for drinking, swimming, and boating. . . . For decades 
Americans had assumed that air and water were free and plenti-
ful and the industrial community gave little thought to pollu-
tion. . . . By the 1960s it was obvious that decisive steps had to 
                                                     
 12. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997). 
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be taken to correct this imbalance and to prevent future reoccur-
rences.13 
On July 9, 1970, President Richard Nixon spoke to Congress about 
reorganization plans to establish EPA.14 Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 
1970 “pull[ed] together into one agency”—what is today known as 
EPA—“a variety of research, monitoring, standard-setting and enforce-
ment activities” that were dispersed “through[out] several [other] de-
partments and agencies.”15 Nixon charged EPA with “protecting the en-
vironment by abating [and controlling] pollution.”16 The principal roles 
and functions of EPA as set forth in 1970 included: 
 Establish[ing] and enforc[ing] . . . environmental protection 
standards consistent with national environmental goals. 
 Conduct[ing] . . . research on the adverse effects of pollution 
and on methods and equipment for controlling it, . . . gather-
ing . . . information on pollution, and . . . us[ing] . . . this in-
formation in strengthening environmental protection pro-
grams and recommending policy changes. 
 Assisting others, through grants, technical assistance and 
other means in arresting [environmental pollution]. 
 Assisting the Council on Environmental Quality in develop-
ing and recommending to the President new policies for the 
protection of the environment.17 
Nixon insisted on viewing the environment as a whole, stating “the 
environment must be perceived as a single, interrelated system.”18 To-
day, EPA can be summed up as an organized governmental action guar-
antying the protection of the environment and human health. 19 Fur-
thermore, EPA has become “the primary federal agency for regulating 
the national environment.”20 It works to protect the surrounding envi-
ronment and to ensure that all Americans are protected from significant 
health risks.21 Today EPA regulates “air pollution, water pollution, . . . 
hazardous waste disposal, pesticides, radiation, toxic substances, and 
                                                     
 13. Phil Wisman, EPA History (1970–1985), U.S. ENV’L. PROT. AGENCY (Nov. 1985), 
http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-history-1970-1985. 
 14.  Nixon, supra note 8; see also Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 F.R. 15623 
(Dec. 2, 1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 698 (2012). 
 15. Nixon, supra note 8. 
 16.  Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. 40 C.F.R. § 1.3 (2013). 
 20. ROBERT W. COLLIN, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: CLEANING UP 
AMERICA’S ACT 1 (2006). 
 21. U.S. ENV’L. PROT. AGENCY, FY 2013 ANNUAL PLAN (2013), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2013/EPA_OIG_FY_2013_Annual_Plan_not508.pdf.  
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wildlife.”22 However, this article will be focused particularly on water 
pollution, the CWA, and EPA’s enforcement of water quality under the 
CWA. 
The CWA has a very long history beginning with the River and 
Harbor Act of 1886, which was re-codified in the Refuse Act of 1899 
(Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899) and ended with the CWA that we 
know today.23 Congress modeled the CWA after the Clean Air Act,24 and 
today the CWA is the principal federal statute governing water pollution 
in the United States.25 Congress enacted the CWA “to restore and main-
tain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s wa-
ters.”26 EPA, along with other federal, state, and local agencies, oversees 
all CWA programs.27 
The Refuse Act of 1899 was the federal government’s first attempt 
to control water pollution.28 The Act provided that “[i]t shall not be law-
ful to throw, discharge, or deposit . . . any refuse matter of any kind . . . 
other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom 
in a liquid state into any navigable water of the United States[.]”29 Es-
sentially the Act cemented the federal government’s authority to pre-
vent pollution in navigable waters.30 Almost fifty years later, Congress 
passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) on June 30, 
1948, so as to “enhance the quality and value of our water resources and 
to establish a national policy for the prevention, control and abatement 
of water pollution.”31 The FWPCA has been amended several times since 
1948: the Water Pollution Control Act Extension of 1952, the Water Pol-
lution Control Act Amendments of 1956, the FWCPA Amendments of 
1961, the Water Quality Act of 1965, the Clean Water Restoration Act of 
                                                     
 22. COLLIN, supra note 20, at 1. 
 23. N. William Hines, History of the 1972 Clean Water Act: The Story Behind How 
the 1972 Act Became the Capstone on a Decade of Extraordinary Environmental Reform, J. 
ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 80, 83 (2013), available at http://gwujeel.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/4-
2-hines.pdf.  
 24. Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 622 F.3d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 
132 S.Ct. 1367 (2012) (citing Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner, 58 F.3d 564, 565 (10th Cir. 
1995)); see also S. Pines Assocs. ex rel. Goldmeier v. U.S., 912 F.2d 713, 716 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(citing S. Rep. No. 92 – 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1971), reprinted in, 1971 U.S. Code 
Cong. & Admin. News pp. 3668, 3730).  
 25. CHRISTOPHER L. BELL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 317 (Thomas 
F.P. Sullivan ed., 20th ed.  2009). 
 26. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). 
 27. 33 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2006). 
 28. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, A Brief Summary of the History of NPDES, 
http://www.epa.gov/region1/npdes/history.html (last visited May 28, 2014). 
 29. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2006); see also 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (2012) (defining “navigable 
waters” for purposes of the Rivers and Harbors Act). 
 30. See 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2006).  
 31. COLLIN, supra note 20, at 20–21. 
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1966, and the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970.32 Despite these 
many amendments, the FWCPA did not effectively implement the law 
set forth by Congress. 33  Thus, the FWCPA underwent a substantial 
change in 1972; it was restructured to give the EPA administrator the 
authority over water pollution control.34 Today’s CWA traces its origin 
to the FWPCA amendments of 1972.35 The 1972 amendments are known 
for accomplishing two important tasks.36 First, the amendments enacted 
broad federal standards and a federal permit program that established 
minimum water protections, which were to be observed by the states 
and citizens.37 Second, the amendments vested power in EPA and the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) as enforcement agencies.38 
The CWA prohibits “the discharge of any pollutant by any person” 
without a permit, into “navigable waters[,]” which are defined as “the 
waters of the United States.”39 The term “‘pollutant’” includes, “dredged 
spoil . . . rock, [and] sand . . . .”40 Furthermore, “‘discharge of a[ny] pollu-
tant’” means “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from 
any point source.”41 The Code of Federal Regulations defines “waters of 
the United States” as “intrastate lakes, rivers, streams . . . mudflats, 
sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa 
lakes, or natural ponds . . . .”42 Therefore, a property owner must obtain 
a permit prior to discharging fill material (such as soil and rock) into 
navigable waters (such as a wetland). If a property owner fails to do so, 
they are in violation of the CWA.  
The CWA establishes two permit schemes. The first authorizes the 
Secretary of the Army, through the Corps, to issue a permit “for the dis-
charge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters . . . .”43 The 
second authorizes EPA to issue a permit for the discharge of pollutants 
not including dredged or fill material.44 Thus, the Corps and EPA share 
responsibility in executing and enforcing the CWA’s permit provisions. 
                                                     
 32. ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE CONSTITUTION: LEGAL 
STRUCTURE AND THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO A CLEAN AND HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 10–22 (2d 
ed., 2009). 
 33. COLLIN, supra note 20, at 21. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See generally id. (giving several examples of how the 1972 amendments funda-
mentally shifted the way the act is implemented.). 
 36. See CRAIG, supra note 32, 22–27. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2006) (“the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be 
unlawful.”); 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006) (“The Secretary may issue permits, after notice and 
opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the naviga-
ble waters . . . .”); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006) (“the waters of the United States.”); Sackett v. 
U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1368 (2012). 
 40. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2006). 
 41. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2006). 
 42. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2013). 
 43. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (g)–(h) (2006). 
 44. See generally 33 U.S.C. §1342 (2006) (remaining silent on the discharge of 
dredged or fill material.). 
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Section 404 of the CWA is the principal statute for regulating all 
activities within wetland areas.45 Section 404 “has three goals: [1] pro-
tect the environment and human health and safety, [2] deter violations, 
and [3] treat the regulated community fairly and equitably.”46 When a 
party has violated Section 404 of the CWA, the Corps or EPA may bring 
an action to compel the restoration of any property that was filled with-
out the proper permit.47 Thus, the CWA permits either the Corps or 
EPA to engage in enforcement activities and bring an action compelling 
the return of any property into compliance. However, the CWA is not 
the only environmental statute that permits EPA to compel compliance–
it is one of many. The next section of this article discusses EPA’s en-
forcement scheme and the many enforcement options at its disposal. 
III. EPA’S ENFORCMENT SCHEME & ENFORCEMENT 
MECHANISMS UNDER ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES 
GENERALLY 
EPA faces many “obstacles in effectively enforcing environmental 
laws.”48 First, the agency is outnumbered because there are more regu-
lated entities than EPA employees.49 Second, the “geographic dispersal 
of [these] entities across the country” is large.”50 Third, the agency faces 
travel and budgetary restrictions.51 Fourth, a factual record is required 
prior to judicial enforcement, which takes time and resources to gath-
er.52 Finally, “the passage of time between the acts [causing] . . . the al-
leged violation and” EPA’s action can be lengthy.53  EPA relies on a 
number of civil enforcement mechanisms “to help it overcome these ob-
stacles.”54 Generally, enforcement mechanisms under all of the major 
federal environmental statutes governed by EPA include: 
 Administrative penalties imposed by agencies for various 
violations; 
 Administrative orders to respond to violations; 
 Civil actions for relief; 
                                                     
 45. See BELL ET AL., supra note 25, at 359. 
 46. Water: Outreach & Communication, Section 404 Enforcement, EPA, 
http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/outreach/fact15.cfm (last updated Oct. 9, 2012). 
 47. See BELL ET AT., supra note 25, at 364–65. 
 48. Lowell Rothschild, Before and After Sackett v. U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 59 FED. LAW. 46–47 (2012). 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. 
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 Civil penalties up to $32,500 per violation or per day of vio-
lation; 
 Citizens’ civil actions to compel compliance with violations; 
 Criminal sanctions against organizations and individuals 
for misrepresentation or knowing or negligent violation of 
the statutes.55 
Due to inflation adjustments, civil penalties in 2012 were increased 
from $32,500 to $37,500 per violation or per day of violation.56 EPA has 
great deference to decide whether to issue civil penalties, and the statu-
tory language of many of the major environmental statutes provides 
considerable amount of discretion regarding enforcement.57 Normally, 
the agency starts a continuing penalty from the first determination of a 
violation and the final proof that the alleged violator is in compliance, 
and then adjusts the penalty up or down, as it deems necessary.58  
EPA pursues some enforcement actions vigorously while declining 
to enforce others, letting other actions settle or choosing to drop actions 
altogether. 59  If an alleged violator acts in bad faith, acts with 
knowledge, or is a repeat offender, EPA is more likely to bring an en-
forcement action to ensure compliance.60 However, there are numerous 
examples of EPA initiating an enforcement action against first-time of-
fenders.61 When EPA decides to pursue an enforcement action against a 
potential violator, it can do so internally or refer the case to the De-
partment of Justice (the DOJ).62 However, if EPA decides to pursue the 
action internally, the action is subject to EPA’s procedural rules, and the 
prosecutor is likely to be more familiar with EPA.63 Therefore, EPA en-
joys considerable benefits by pursuing the action internally.  
Since Sackett v. EPA dealt specifically with an administrative 
compliance order under the CWA, it is necessary to also set forth the 
types of enforcement mechanisms under the CWA. 
IV. ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS UNDER THE CLEAN WATER 
ACT 
                                                     
 55. See CRAIG, supra note 32, at 20–29. 
 56. Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1370 n. 1 (2012) (“The Fed-
eral Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 890 . . . as amended by the 
Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 . . . authorizes EPA to adjust the maximum pen-
alt[ies] for inflation.”); 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 (2013). 
 57. See Barnett M. Lawrence, EPA’s Civil Penalty Policies: Making the Penalty Fit 
the Violation, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. 10529, 10529 (1992), http://elr.info/news-
analysis/22/10529/epas-civil-penalty-policies-making-penalty-fit-violation. 
 58. BELL ET AL., supra note 25, at 94. 
 59. Id. at 95. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. at 96; see also Lawrence, supra note 57, at 10533–34. 
 63. BELL ET AL., supra note 25, at 96–97. 
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Similarly, enforcement mechanisms under the CWA trace their 
origin to the Refuse Act of 1899 and the FWCPA of 1948.64 Under the 
Refuse Act of 1899, the Secretary of the Army permitted deposits of ma-
terials in navigable waters, so long as anchorage and navigation of ves-
sels were not hindered as a result.65 The Corps had the administrative 
task of issuing and monitoring the conduct that followed.66 Historically, 
the Corps relied on “friendly persuasion” and recommended prosecution 
only in cases of “flagrant violation.”67 
[I]t has long been standing policy to secure compliance with . . . 
provisions short of legal proceedings. Prosecution was recom-
mended only in cases of willful or intentional violations. It was 
the Corps’ established policy not to recommend prosecution 
when the violation was “trivial, apparently unpremeditated, and 
[resulted] in no material public injury” or when the violation 
was “minor, unintentional, or accidental, and the party respon-
sible [made] good the damages suffered.”68 
Under the FWPCA, the Surgeon General of the Public Health Ser-
vice and the Federal Works Administrator held responsibilities relating 
to water pollution control.69 The Surgeon General would issue a formal 
notification to the person(s) discharging a pollutant on the basis of re-
ports, surveys, and studies.70 The notification set forth recommended 
remedial measures and specified a reasonable time for compliance.71 If 
the recipient did not comply within the specified time, the Surgeon Gen-
eral would recommend the state where the discharge occurred initiate a 
suit.72 If, within a reasonable time after the notification, the alleged vio-
lator did not comply, and if the state where the discharge occurred failed 
to initiate a suit, the Federal Security Administrator would call a public 
hearing where the board—made up of five or more persons appointed by 
the Administrator—upon the presentation of evidence would make rec-
ommendations to the Administrator concerning the necessary actions 
needed to secure compliance.73 After providing the alleged violator an 
opportunity to comply with the board’s recommendations, the Federal 
                                                     
 64. See generally Diane D. Eames, The Refuse Act of 1899: Its Scope and Role in 
Control of Water Pollution, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1444 (1970), available at 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol58/iss6/5/ (exploring “possible 
modes of action and remedies available under” The Refuse Act of 1899). 
 65. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2013). 
 66. Eames, supra note 64, at 1452. 
 67. Id. at 1453. 
 68. Id. at 1453 n.61 (alteration in original). 
 69. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-845, § 1, 62 Stat. 
1155, (1948). 
 70. Id. § 2(d)(2), 62 Stat. at 1156. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. § 2(d)(3), 62 Stat. at 1156–57. 
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Security Administrator could then request the Attorney General initiate 
a suit to bring the alleged violator into compliance.74 
Today, Section 1319 of the CWA governs the standards and en-
forcement mechanisms EPA may utilize.75 When EPA determines there 
has been a violation of the CWA there are three main civil enforcement 
options at its disposal: First, EPA may assess administrative penalties; 
second, EPA may commence a civil action; lastly, EPA may issue an 
administrative compliance order.76 Note, if EPA pursues either the first 
or second option, the alleged violator is guaranteed notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard prior to assessment of any penalties.77 Normally EPA 
will choose to pursue an option that is appropriate for the violation and 
the least resource consuming.78 Under all of the options, EPA must first 
notify the recipient of the violation and whether EPA intends to bring 
an enforcement action against such recipient.79 
A. Administrative Penalties 
As a civil enforcement option, EPA may assess administrative pen-
alties under §1319(g)(1) of the CWA. 80  This section provides that 
“[w]henever on the basis of any information available[,] the Administra-
tor finds that any person has violated” specific sections of the CWA or 
“the Secretary of the Army . . . finds that any person has violated any 
permit condition or limitation” they may assess Class I or Class II civil 
penalties.81 Class I penalties “may not exceed $10,000 per violation” and 
may add up to a maximum amount of $32,500.82 As previously stated, 
due to inflation, civil penalties in 2012 increased from $32,500 to 
$37,500 per violation or per day of violation.83 Class II penalties “may 
not exceed $10,000 per day for each day during which the violation con-
tinues” and up to a maximum amount of $125,000.84 EPA must give the 
alleged violator written notice of the proposed penalty “and an oppor-
tunity to request, within thirty days[,]” a hearing in which the violator 
will have “a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present evidence” 
prior to issuing a Class I penalty.85 Prior to assessing Class II penalties, 
EPA must give the alleged violator notice and an opportunity for an ad-
                                                     
 74. Id. § 2(d)(4), 62 Stat. at 1157. 
 75. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2012). 
 76. Id. § 1319(a)(2)–(g). 
 77. Id. § 1319(g). 
 78. LYNN M. GALLAGHER, CLEAN WATER HANDBOOK 173–74 (3d ed. 2003). 
 79. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (2001); BELL ET AL., supra note 25, at 371. 
 80. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(1) (2001). 
 81. Id.  § 1319(g)(1). 
 82. Id. § 1319(g)(2)(A). 
 83. Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1370 n.1 (2012) (“The Fed-
eral Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 890 . . . as amended by the 
Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 . . . authorizes the EPA to adjust [the] maximum 
penalt[ies] [above] for inflation.”); see 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 (2012). 
 84. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2)(B) (2006). 
 85. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2)(A) (2006).  
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judicatory hearing according to Section 554 of Title 5.86 In 2011, EPA 
obtained $48 million from issued Class I and Class II administrative 
penalties.87 
Generally, upon the assessment of an administrative penalty, ei-
ther Class I or Class II, the recipient is entitled to an “opportunity to be 
heard and to present evidence.”88 Furthermore, the public is entitled to 
comment, and any penalty assessed is subject to judicial review.89 In 
determining the amount of any administrative penalty assessed under 
the CWA, EPA or the Secretary of the Army, at their discretion, may 
take into consideration a number of equitable factors including: (1) the 
seriousness of the violation, (2) the economic benefit to society resulting 
from the violation, (3) the record of past CWA violations (4) good-faith 
efforts to comply, (5) the violator’s ability to pay, and (6) other such mat-
ters surrounding the violation.90 
B. Civil Enforcement Actions 
As a second enforcement option, EPA may commence a civil en-
forcement action in District Court seeking civil penalties for CWA viola-
tions. Section 1319(b) provides that “the administrator is authorized to 
commence a civil action for appropriate relief . . . for any violation for 
which he is authorized to issue a compliance order under subsection (a) 
of this section.”91 An alleged violator is afforded a jury trial, however, 
the court holds the power in determining the appropriate penalty 
amount.92 In calculating an appropriate penalty amount, EPA created 
an equation, which includes a component of economic benefit, plus grav-
ity of the violation, plus or minus adjustments.93 The gravity component 
consists of four considerations: “(1) the significance of the violation, (2) 
the actual or potential harm to human health or the environment, (3) 
the number of violations, and (4) the duration of noncompliance.”94 Ad-
justments are added or subtracted to the equation based on four circum-
                                                     
 86. Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2012) (stating the requirements for adjudications under the 
Administrative Procedure Act). 
 87. Compliance and Enforcement Annual Results 2011 Fiscal Year, U.S. ENV’L. 
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/endofyear/eoy2011/eoy-
data.html (last updated Dec. 8, 2011) [hereinafter Annual Results 2011 Fiscal Year] (stating 
administrative penalties for 2011 as $47,880,973). 
 88. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4)(B) (2006); see also Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 622 
F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S.Ct. 1367 (2012) (holding that a violator is enti-
tled to the “opportunity to be heard and to present evidence”)(citation omitted).”). 
 89. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4)(A), (g)(8) (2006). 
 90. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(3) (2006); see also Sackett, 622 F.3d at 1142; Frank B. 
Cross, Administrative Orders and Penalties, 2 FED. ENVT’L REG. OF REAL ESTATE § 5.29 
(2013). 
 91. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (2006). 
 92. See GALLAGHER, supra note 78, at 177–78. 
 93. See BELL ET AL., supra note 25, at 378–79. 
 94. Id. at 378. 
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stances: (1) a history of non-cooperation, (2) ability to pay, (3) litigation 
considerations, and (4) other considerations.95 “It is EPA’s policy that 
penalties should recover the full” amount “of noncompliance, calculated 
from the beginning of noncompliance until” the alleged violator is in 
compliance.96 
C. Administrative Compliance Orders 
EPA may issue an administrative compliance order as a third civil 
enforcement option. Section 1319(a) provides: 
Whenever, on the basis of any information available to him, the 
Administrator finds that any person is in violation of any condi-
tion or limitation which implements [various sections of the 
CWA] . . . he shall notify the person in alleged violation . . . if 
beyond the thirtieth day after the Administrator’s notification . . 
. the Administrator shall issue an order requiring such person to 
comply with such condition . . .97 
EPA officials assert that administrative compliance orders are the 
beginning of the conversation between EPA and an alleged violator.98 
EPA has issued administrative compliance orders “to individuals and 
industry—both large and small.”99 At its core, administrative compli-
ance orders are issued to those whom EPA believes are in violation of 
the CWA.100 The orders set forth the nature of the violation, specify a 
date by which the individual must comply with applicable law101 and 
often include a compliance schedule and interval assignments that must 
be completed while taking the necessary steps to compliance.102 “There 
is no hearing or other adjudication” prior to the issuance of an adminis-
trative compliance order, nor may a recipient obtain an agency hearing 
afterwards.103 After an administrative compliance order has been issued 
and EPA has determined a violation has occurred, EPA will impose ad-
                                                     
 95. Id. at 379. 
 96. GALLAGHER, supra note 78, at 178. 
 97. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (2006). 
 98. Megan Anderson, EPA Enforcement After Sackett v. EPA: The Future of EPA 
Compliance Orders, MICH. J. OF ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. (Apr. 5, 2012), available at 
http://students.law.umich.edu/mjeal/2012/04/epa-enforcement-after-sackett-v-epa-the-future-
of-epa-compliance-orders/. 
 99. Rothschild, supra note 48, at 47. 
100. Id. 
101. Id.; see also Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 622 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 
2010), rev’d, 132 S.Ct. 1367 (2012) (quoting S. Pines Assocs. by Goldmeier v. United States, 
912 F.2d 713, 715 (4th Cir. 1990)). 
102. See GALLAGHER, supra note 78, at 175; see also BELL ET AL., supra note 25, at 
377. 
103. Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Property Rights, and the Due Process Deficit in 
Environmental Law, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 139, 149 (2012), available at 
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/supreme-court-review/2012/9/scr-2012-
adler.pdf (discussing the Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency case, federal regulations of wet-
lands, and CWA enforcement).  
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ministrative penalties according to the process as described in Part IV-A 
of this article. The agency believes “administrative compliance orders 
are . . . commands”; they are not judgments and do not impose sanctions 
for violating the CWA or violating the compliance order itself.104 Howev-
er, some EPA officials and agents believe that administrative compli-
ance orders are only warnings.105 Failing to comply with an administra-
tive compliance order could create the basis for a knowing violation in a 
criminal case or a claim of bad faith in a civil action.106 Administrative 
compliance orders allow EPA to respond quickly to ongoing violations of 
major environmental laws without becoming immediately entangled in 
litigation.107 A Senate report from 1972 stated: 
One purpose of these new requirements [for administrative 
compliance orders] is to avoid the necessity of lengthy fact find-
ing, investigations, and negotiations at the time of enforcement. 
Enforcement of violations of requirements under this Act should 
be based on relatively narrow fact situations requiring a mini-
mum of discretionary decision making or delay.108 
EPA issues administrative compliance orders mostly because “the 
agency can issue them based ‘on any information’ available to it.”109 
Thus, EPA can require a party to comply “based on information that 
[may] not be sufficient to meet . . . judicial standards” required to prose-
cute a violation of the CWA.110 Out of all of the enforcement options at 
EPA’s disposal, administrative compliance orders are EPA’s primary 
enforcement option.111 As the table below indicates, in 2011 EPA issued 
a total of 1,324 administrative compliance orders under all major envi-
ronmental statutes.112 
 
Fiscal Year 2011 
Enforcement & Compliance Assurance Accomplishments 
Civil Enforcement and Compliance Activities113 
                                                     
104. See GALLAGHER, supra note 78, at 176; see also BELL ET AL., supra note 25, at 
377. 
105. Timothy Sandefur, Compliance–or Else: The EPA’s Compliance Order Regime 
Creates a Hobson’s Choice, 34 REG. 8, 10 n.4 (Winter 2011-2012), available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv34n4/v34n4-2.pdf. 
106. See GALLAGHER, supra note 78, at 176. 
107. Sam Wheeler, Ninth Circuit: EPA Compliance Orders Are Not Subject to Pre-
Enforcement Judicial Review, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 611, 611–12 (2011) (discussing what admin-
istrative compliance orders are and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Sackett v. 
U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 622 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
108. S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 3730 (1972). 
109. Rothschild, supra note 48, at 47.  
110. Id. 
111. See Annual Results 2011 Fiscal Year, supra note 87 (comparing administrative 
compliance orders with other civil enforcement actions such as civil judicial complaints). 
112. Id.  
113. Id. 
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Referrals of Civil Judicial Enforcement Cases to Department of 
Justice (DOJ) 
199  
Supplemental Referrals of Civil Judicial Enforcement Cases to 
DOJ 
33  
Civil Judicial Complaints Filed with Court  148  
Civil Judicial Enforcement Case Conclusions  182  
Administrative Penalty Order Complaints  1,760  
Final Administrative Penalty Orders  1,735 
Administrative Compliance Orders  1,324  
Cases with Supplemental Environmental Projects  103  
Inspections/Evaluations  19,000  
Civil Investigations  177  
Compliance Assistance Center User Sessions  3,500,000 
 
Furthermore, in the same year EPA issued 1,760 administrative 
penalty order complaints and 1,735 administrative penalty orders.114 As 
previously discussed, administrative penalty orders (aka administrative 
penalties) are issued after an administrative compliance order or a civil 
action is brought and a violation is deemed to have occurred.115 Thus, 
although the data indicates a greater number of administrative penal-
ties were issued over administrative compliance orders, when fully un-
derstood, administrative compliance orders in 2011 outnumbered ad-
ministrative penalties.116 Moreover, a comparison between administra-
tive compliance orders and civil judicial complaints filed with the court 
and civil judicial enforcement case conclusions again indicate that ad-
ministrative compliance orders are used more often than any other en-
forcement mechanism.117 Specifically, EPA issued 148 civil judicial com-
plaints filed with the court and 182 civil judicial enforcement case con-
clusions in 2011.118 Both of these combined totals do not outnumber ad-
ministrative compliance orders.119 
Of the 1,324 issued compliance orders in 2011, EPA issued 479 ad-
ministrative compliance orders under the CWA.120 Of those 479 admin-
                                                     
114. Id. 
115. GALLAGHER, supra note 78, at 175–76. 
116. Annual Results 2011 Fiscal Year, supra note 87.  
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119  Id.  
120. Carolyn L. McIntoch, Sackett: A Victory, But Not a Solution: Supreme Court 
Rules on Important Clean Water Act Case, COAL AGE MAG. 80 (April 2012), available at 
 
2013] ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY'S 
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS AFTER SACKETT V. EPA 
79 
 
istrative compliance orders issued pursuant to the CWA, EPA issued 
370 administrative compliance orders pursuant to the CWA-NPDES,121 
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System that “controls wa-
ter pollution by regulating point sources that discharge pollutants into 
waters of the United States.”122 However, EPA issued only twelve ad-
ministrative compliance orders under the CWA-311,123 the Oil Spill Pre-
vention Compliance Monitoring section that “regulates oil storage.”124 
Comparing these numbers among the CWA sections, it is clear that the 
greatest number of administrative compliance orders have been issued 
under the NPDES section of the CWA.125 This determination does not 
subtract from the belief that administrative compliance orders are 
EPA’s most used enforcement mechanism, but adds to it.126 
 
  
                                                                                                                           
http://www.pattonboggs.com/files/News/d84685bd-cb16-41eb-bc12-
7c9cbf852d8c/Presentation/NewsAttachment/3d3b7ce9-70c0-4253-b4ce-
7e8c0115cf8d/CA_April_LEGAL.pdf; see, e.g., U.S. ENV’L. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL 
ENFORCEMENT TRENDS REPORT 6 (June 2012), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/nets/nets-e4-acos.pdf [hereinafter EPA] 
(National Enforcement Trends graph showing the number of EPA administrative compliance 
orders from 1994 to 2011 for all major environmental statutes governed by EPA) . 
121. National Enforcement Trends: FY 1994 – FY 2011 Administrative Compliance 
Orders, U.S. ENV’L. PROT. AGENCY (2011).  
122. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, U.S. ENV’L. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/index.cfm (last updated Mar. 12, 2009, 11:32 PM). 
123. Id. 
124. Oil Spill Prevention Compliance Monitoring, U.S. ENV’L. PROT. AGENCY, 
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Fiscal Year 2001-2011 EPA Administrative Compliance Orders127 
Statute 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
CAA  192  144 197 198 187 166 135 156 152 109 154 
CERCL
A 
217  194 206 189 164 224 235 155 346 119 144 
CWA-
NPDES 
367  490 558 678 749 414 361 367 392 420 370 
CWA-
311 
12  11 10 7 17 8 17 13 6 14 12 
CWA-
404 
66  45 87 90 77 81 54 59 85 98 97 
EPCRA 1  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FIFRA  12 12 38 93 55 162 62 71 71 98 83 
MPRSA NR NR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RCRA 30 34 31 28 28 20 26 25 24 30 37 
SDWA-
PWSS 
542  283 419 478 609 308 278 482 495 393 402 
SDWA-
UIC 
35 36 33 43 42 51 68 57 16 14 19 
TSCA 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Multi-
Program 
1 0 1 3 8 4 10 4 1 6 6 
Total 1,476 1,250 1,807 1,936 1,936 1,438 1,247 1,390 1,588 1,302 1,324 
 
Thus, it appears that administrative compliance orders are EPA’s 
preferred enforcement tool due to the comparison between other en-
forcement mechanisms, the sheer number of orders issued, and the un-
derstanding that EPA may issue the orders based on any information 
made available to it.128 
Additionally, EPA and the Corps have evolved in their efforts to 
abate and control water pollution. In retrospect, a comparison of how 
the Corps and Surgeon General enforced violations of the Refuse Act of 
1899 and violations of the FWPCA of 1948 with how the Corps and EPA 
enforce violations and ensure compliance today, illustrates EPA has 
moved away from friendly persuasion towards more aggressive enforce-
ment tactics.129 In the past, the federal government may have been more 
forgiving when it came to water pollution since the ramifications of pol-
                                                     
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Compare Eames, supra note 64, at 1470, with EPA, supra note 123, at 6.  
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lution were not fully understood. Additionally, the federal government 
was fairly new at enforcing water pollution; the Refuse Act of 1899 was 
only recently created.130 Also it appears that before the creation of EPA, 
the federal government was more eager to hold public hearings prior to 
initiating suits.131 
However, today as EPA has grown and its powers have increased, 
cases like Sackett v. EPA give the impression that EPA no longer has 
the time nor wants to hold public hearings prior to initiating a suit.132 
This indicates that EPA officials have forgotten the original intentions 
behind the agency’s foundation. As the years have passed and the rami-
fications of pollution have been clarified, we can see that EPA and the 
Corps have cracked down on enforcement.133 No longer do EPA and the 
Corps consider violations to be trivial, unpremeditated, minor, uninten-
tional, or accidental, as many times enforcement actions are taken 
against parties big and small.134 The millions of dollars collected in ad-
ministrative penalties each year and the hundreds of administrative 
compliance orders issued to recipients in every region of the United 
States strongly indicate a large shift from preventing only flagrant vio-
lations to preventing any violation irrespective of whether it is minor or 
willful.135 
In light of the background provided on the CWA’s enforcement 
tools, it is necessary to set forth the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Sackett v. EPA in order to understand where EPA’s enforcement tools 
stand today and where they need to be in order to pass muster. 
V. THE SACKETT V. EPA DECISION 
On March 21, 2012 a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court handed down 
a long-awaited decision holding that property owners and regulated en-
tities may bring suit challenging EPA compliance orders under the 
APA.136 Prior to the decision, EPA opined that administrative compli-
ance order recipients could not challenge EPA’s jurisdiction arguing that 
recipients had to either comply with the order or wait for EPA to bring a 
civil suit, and only then could they seek judicial review.137 Many recipi-
ents who chose to challenge EPA’s administrative compliance orders 
were often assessed extensive monetary penalties for each day they 
failed to comply.138 The Supreme Court’s decision has sparked a nation-
wide discussion among scholars and practitioners about the future of 
                                                     
130. See Eames, supra note 64.  
131. See id. at 1456. 
132. See Wheeler, supra note 107, at 612. 
133. See EPA, supra note 123, at 6.  
134. See id.  
135. See id. 
136. Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1374 (2012). 
137. Id. at 1340. 
138. Id. 
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EPA’s use of administrative compliance orders.139 Many wonder if EPA 
will change its procedures to allow a more thorough examination of the 
law before issuing an administrative compliance order or if EPA will 
continue its current practices. 140 It will be important to see how EPA 
responds to this decision over time because the decision affects both 
those at the top—EPA—and those at the bottom—the everyday property 
owner. 141 
A. Facts & Procedural History 
In 2005, Michael and Chantell Sackett, owners of a small construc-
tion company, purchased 0.63 acres within an existing residential sub-
division in Bonner County, Idaho, just north of Priest Lake.142 Several 
other lots, some containing permanent structures, separated their lot 
from the lake.143 After obtaining the necessary local building permits 
nearly two years later, the Sacketts’ employees began work on the con-
struction of their three-bedroom, single-level, family home.144 In April 
and May of 2007, while in the process of building their home, the Sack-
etts filled part of their lot with fill materials—soil and rock.145 A few 
days into the construction of their home, EPA and Corps agents came 
onto the Sacketts’ property and verbally ordered their employees to stop 
working.146 After EPA’s visit, “the Sacketts contacted their local Corps 
office…for an after-the-fact wetlands fill-permit.” 147 However, the Sack-
etts declined to submit the application because it required them to con-
cede that their property contained wetlands.”148 During that summer 
and fall of 2007, the Sacketts contacted EPA several times to inquire as 
to why EPA officials stopped the Sacketts’ homebuilding.149 However, 
EPA did not issue a response.150 
                                                     
139. See Turner Smith & Margaret Holden, Case Comment, Sackett v. EPA, 37 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 301 (2013).  
140. See David Weinstein et al., Bolstering the Presumption of APA Reviewability: 
The Supreme Court Subjects CWA Compliance Orders, and Potentially Other Agency Ac-
tions, to Immediate Judicial Review, 13 NO. 2 ABA ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT & CRIMES COMM. 
NEWSL. 6, 6–8 (2012). 
141. See Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1370.  
142. Greg Stohr, Supreme Court, Mike and Chantell Sackett vs. the EPA, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK MAGAZINE (Aug. 11, 2011), 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/mike-and-chantell-sackett-vs-the-epa-
08112011.html.   
143. Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1370 (2012).  
144. Damien M. Schiff, Sackett v. EPA: Compliance Orders and The Right of Judi-
cial Review, CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 113, 114 (Ilyia Shapiro et al. eds., 2012).  
145. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1370. 
146. Schiff, supra note 144, at 114. 
147. Id.  
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. See id. 
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In November 2007, EPA issued the Sacketts an administrative 
compliance order under the CWA.151 EPA’s administrative compliance 
order stated that the Sacketts’ lot contained wetlands subject to federal 
jurisdiction, which the Sacketts had unlawfully filled without a per-
mit.152 Specifically, the administrative compliance order concluded: (1) 
the Sacketts’ property “contained wetlands within the meaning of 33 
C.F.R. § 328.4,” (2) the property’s wetlands were adjacent to Priest 
Lake, which is “a navigable water,” (3) the Sacketts “discharged fill ma-
terial into wetlands” at their property, (4) “[b]y causing such fill materi-
al to enter waters of the United States, the Sacketts have engaged, and 
are continuing to engage, in the discharge of pollutants,” and (5) the 
Sacketts violated the CWA by discharging fill materials into the waters 
of the United States without a permit.153 EPA’s compliance order di-
rected the Sacketts to immediately restore their property in accordance 
with EPA’s Restoration Work Plan, which included restoring the proper-
ty to its “pre-disturbance vegetative condition” and providing EPA em-
ployees access to the Sackett property and all records and documenta-
tion relating to the property.154 If the Sacketts failed to restore their 
property as set forth under the administrative compliance order they 
would be fined $37,500 per day. 155  
Under the CWA, courts have generally held that every day a wet-
land remains filled without a permit is a day a violation is accrued.156 
The statute of limitations under CWA regarding wetlands is five 
years.157 Accordingly, one act of filling a wetland without a permit, in 
theory, could result in a maximum penalty of $68,475,000 before EPA 
filed a suit.158 
The Sacketts requested a hearing with EPA officials, arguing that 
their property was not subject to EPA control. Their request was de-
nied.159 Upon the denial of their request, the Sacketts were limited to 
three choices: (1) comply with the administrative compliance order, (2) 
refuse to comply, while waiting for EPA to bring a civil action to enforce 
the administrative compliance order and thus their compliance, all the 
while risking the imposition of incurring up to $37,500 per day in civil 
administrative penalties, or (3) file suit in district court under the 
APA.160 The Sacketts thus faced a devastating choice: obey the adminis-
trative compliance order and restore their residential lot, which would 
                                                     
151. Id. at 114–15. 
152. Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1370–71 (2012). 
153. Id. at 1371. 
154. Schiff, supra note 144, at 115. 
155. Id. at 130. 
156. Sackett , 132 S. Ct. at 1370. 
157. Rothschild, supra note 48, at 48. 
158. Id. 
159. Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1371 (2012). 
160. Weinstein et al., supra note 140, at 8 (discussing Sackett v. U.S. E.P.A. and its 
implications). 
84 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [VOL. 50 
 
cost them thousands of dollars, or ignore the order and take their chanc-
es with EPA 161  Furthermore, ignoring the administrative compliance 
order could be viewed as proof of knowingly violating the CWA and thus 
enhance any civil penalties they could be hit with later.162 
The Sacketts chose to bring suit in the United States District Court 
for the District of Idaho, requesting declaratory and injunctive relief.163 
The Sacketts contended the wetlands were not subject to EPA jurisdic-
tion, and argued that EPA’s issuance of the administrative compliance 
order was “arbitrary and capricious” under the APA because it deprived 
them of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” a viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment.164 EPA moved to dismiss on the grounds 
that an administrative compliance order was not subject to judicial re-
view.165 The District Court agreed and dismissed the Sacketts’ claim for 
want of subject matter jurisdiction reasoning that an administrative 
compliance order was not “final” agency action subject to judicial review 
under APA and that CWA precludes pre-enforcement judicial review of 
administrative compliance orders.166  The District Court’s opinion fol-
lowed the significant amount of case law holding the same. 167 The Sack-
etts appealed and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the CWA 
prohibited pre-enforcement review of administrative compliance orders 
under APA.168 The Ninth Circuit determined that based on the CWA’s 
structure and legislative history, Congress did not intend compliance 
orders to be judicially reviewable.169 It held that an administrative com-
pliance order was really only a warning notice that lacked the kind of 
legal force that gives rise to due process concerns.170 Furthermore, the 
Ninth Circuit “credited the government’s contention that judicial review 
of compliance orders would frustrate Congress’s enforcement options 
and would hamper the agency’s effective administration of the Act.”171 
The result reached by the Ninth Circuit was in line with the consensus 
of several other sister circuits.172 Following the Ninth Circuit’s decision, 
the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.173 
                                                     
161. See id.  
162. See id.  
163. Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1371 (2012). 
164. Id.; see also Rothschild, supra note 48. 
165. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371.  
166. See id. 
167. Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 622 F.3d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 
132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).  
168. Id. at 1139. 
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trative compliance orders should not be subject to judicial review). 
173. Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1367 (2012)  
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B. Circuit Split Prior to Supreme Court’s Decision in Sackett v. EPA 
The Sacketts’ case was very similar to a 2003 Eleventh Circuit 
case, Tennessee Valley Authority v. Whitman, (TVA v. Whitman), in 
which the court held that EPA could not impose penalties for a violation 
of an administrative compliance order under the Clean Air Act (CAA) 
because the order itself did not constitute “final” agency action and was 
not judicially reviewable as its enforcement would violate due process.174 
As previously mentioned, the CWA was modeled after the CAA; the two 
acts have very similar enforcement tools.175 EPA issued an administra-
tive compliance order concluding that the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(TVA) violated the CAA when it undertook rehabilitation projects at 
nine power plants without permits.176 The administrative compliance 
order required that TVA take costly, burdensome actions to comply.177 
EPA delegated to the Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) the task of 
informally adjudicating whether TVA was liable by reconsidering the 
administrative compliance order.178 The EAB decided that TVA did vio-
late the CAA when it acted without a proper permit.179 The TVA filed a 
petition for review with the Eleventh Circuit requesting that asking it 
set aside the EAB order.180 The Eleventh Circuit ultimately held that 
“because an [administrative compliance order] can be issued ‘on the ba-
sis of any information available’ to the Administrator, and because non-
compliance with an [administrative compliance order] automatically 
triggers civil and criminal penalties . . . . The EPA is the ultimate arbi-
ter of guilt or innocence . . . [and] this [CAA] scheme violates the Due 
Process Clause and the separation-of-powers principle.”181 
However, other circuits rejected the theory in TVA v. Whitman,182 
and many district courts followed suit.183 In 1995, the Tenth Circuit held 
                                                     
174. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1239 (11th Cir. 2003). 
175. Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 622 F.3d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 
Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner, 58 F.3d 564, 565 (10th Cir. 1995)); see also S. Pines Assocs. 
ex rel. Goldmeier v. U.S., 912 F.2d 713, 716 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing S. Rep. No. 92-414, 92d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News pp. 3668, 
3730). 
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Ohio Coal Co. v. Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation & Enforcement, 20 F.3d 1418, 1418 
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Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1236 (11th Cir. 2003). 
183. See, e.g., Sharp Land Co. v. U.S., 956 F. Supp. 691, 693–94 (M.D. La. 1996); 
Child v. U.S., 851 F. Supp. 1527, 1533 (D. Utah 1994); Bd. of Managers, Bottineau Cnty. 
Water Res. Dist. v. Bornhoft, 812 F. Supp. 1012, 1014–15 (D. N.D. 1993); McGown v. U.S., 
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that administrative compliance orders did not give a party a right to a 
judicial hearing reasoning that it would undermine EPA’s regulatory 
authority.184 Both the Fourth and Seventh Circuits concluded that Con-
gress intended to preclude judicial review of administrative compliance 
orders prior to the commencement of enforcement proceedings because 
“the structure of these environmental statutes indicate[d] that Congress 
intended to allow EPA to act to address environmental problems quickly 
and without becoming immediately entangled in litigation.”185 The Sev-
enth Circuit believed that: 
In drafting the Clean Water Act, Congress chose to make as-
sessed administrative penalties subject to review while at the 
same time it chose not to make a compliance order judicially re-
viewable unless the EPA decides to bring a civil suit to enforce it 
. . . . Having provided a detailed mechanism for judicial consid-
eration of a compliance order via an enforcement proceeding, 
Congress has impliedly precluded judicial review of a compliance 
order except in an enforcement proceeding.186 
In 1994, the Sixth Circuit joined the Fourth and Seventh Circuits 
holding that district courts are without jurisdiction to review pre-
enforcement orders issued under the CWA.187 Furthermore, as previous-
ly mentioned, in 2010 the Ninth Circuit joined the Tenth, Fourth, Sev-
enth, and Sixth Circuits holding that Congress did not intend for the 
judicial review of administrative compliance orders.188 
C. Pre-Enforcement Review 
To understand the Ninth Circuit’s decision in dismissing the Sack-
ett case it is necessary to understand what constitutes pre-enforcement 
review and why pre-enforcement review was created. Pre-enforcement 
review can trace its’ origin to two conflicting but very important public 
policy objectives: (1) due process and (2) the prompt and efficient admin-
istration of justice.189 The Fifth Amendment provides that “No person 
shall be deprived . . . of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”190 Under the Fifth Amendment there is a common understanding 
that “prior to the government’s taking away an individual’s liberty or 
property, he or she has a right to be heard by a neutral third party em-
                                                                                                                           
747 F. Supp. 539, 542 (E.D. Mo. 1990); Fiscella & Fiscella v. U.S., 717 F. Supp. 1143, 1146–
47 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
184. Laguna Gatuna, Inc., 58 F.3d at 565. 
185. S. Pines Assocs., 912 F.2d at 716; Hoffman Grp., Inc., 902 F.2d at 569; see also 
S. Ohio Coal Co., 20 F.3d at 1426. 
186. Hoffman Grp., Inc., 902 F.2d at 569. 
187. S. Ohio Coal Co., 20 F.3d at 1427. 
188. Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 622 F.3d 1139, 1142–44. (9th Cir. 2009), 
rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).  
189. Rothschild, supra note 48, at 48. 
190. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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powered to decide whether the taking is justified under the law and the 
facts.”191 On the other hand, parties expect the administration of justice 
to be prompt. To ensure justice is swift, not every decision at every level 
can be challenged. 
Concerned with due process, a number of statutes include private 
rights of action indicating when an action can be challenged.192  For 
those statutes that do not provide such rights, Congress provided for 
review of administrative actions under the APA.193 Section 706 of the 
APA provides that “the reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set 
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law.”194 However, in light of expediency concerns, the APA restricts re-
view to “final” agency actions.195 “Final” agency action is judicially re-
viewable under the APA when the action: (1) “mark[s] the ‘consumma-
tion’ of the agency’s decision making process,”196 and (2) “[is] one by 
which ‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ or from which ‘legal 
consequences will flow.’”197 Conversely, agency action is not reviewable 
under the APA if the relevant statute “preclude[s] judicial review.”198 
Therefore in practice, there is a presumption of judicial review under 
the APA unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.199 
Thus, the Supreme Court in Sackett was left to employ this in coming to 
its conclusion. 
D. Supreme Court Decision 
The Sackett Court considered two issues in reaching its holding: (1) 
whether the administrative compliance order was final agency action;200 
and (2) whether the CWA’s statutory scheme precluded APA review.201 
The Court swiftly dismissed the first issue holding that there was no 
doubt the administrative compliance order was agency action, and that 
the administrative compliance order had all the “hallmarks of APA fi-
                                                     
191. Rothschild, supra note 48, at 49. 
192. Id. at 48.  
193. Presumption of Judicial Review Unless Precluded, 2 FED. PROC., L. ED. § 2.282 
(2012). 
194. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
195. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).  
196. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Waterman S.S. Corp. 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948)). 
197. Id.  (quoting Bos. Marine Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 
400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).  
198. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (2012); Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 622 F.3d 1139, 
1142 (9th Cir. 2009). 
199. Rothschild, supra note 48, at 48. 
200. Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1371 (2012). 
201. Id. at 1372–73.  
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nality” because EPA determined the Sacketts’ obligations through the 
compliance order.202 
First, the administrative compliance order articulated that the 
Sacketts have a legal obligation to restore their property according to 
the EPA’s Restoration Work Plan, and provide the EPA agents access to 
the Sacketts’ property and to all relevant property documents.203 Sec-
ond, the administrative compliance order stated that legal consequences 
flow from the issuance of the order.204 Specifically, the administrative 
compliance order exposed the Sacketts to double civil penalties in future 
enforcement proceedings and severely limited their ability to obtain a 
permit from the Corps for fill materials.205 Furthermore, the Court de-
termined that the issuance of the administrative compliance order 
marked the “consummation” of EPA’s decision making process because, 
as the Sacketts learned when their hearing with the EPA was denied, 
the “Findings and Conclusions” within the administrative compliance 
order were not subject to further agency review.206 Additionally, EPA’s 
invitation to the Sacketts to engage in “informal discussion of the terms 
and requirements” and to inform the EPA of any allegations which the 
Sacketts believed were inaccurate, did not present a claim for further 
agency review.207 The possibility that EPA might reconsider the order 
during an informal discussion did “not suffice to make an otherwise fi-
nal agency action nonfinal.”208 
Finally, the APA requires that the person seeking APA review of 
final agency action have “no other adequate remedy in a court.” 209  
There were only two possible paths the Sacketts could take to obtain 
judicial review of the administrative compliance order: (1) wait for the 
EPA to bring a civil action against them or (2) apply for a permit from 
the Corps and then file suit under the APA if the permit was denied.210 
Since the Sacketts could not take action as just described, the Court 
concluded they had no other remedy in court.211 Generally, in CWA en-
forcement cases, judicial review begins via a civil action brought by the 
EPA under 33 U.S.C. § 1319.212 However, alleged violators such as the 
Sacketts could not initiate a civil action against the EPA; every day they 
                                                     
202. Id. at 1371 (“We consider first whether the compliance order is final agency ac-
tion. There is no doubt it is agency action, which the APA defines as including even a ‘failure 
to act.’ §§ 551(13), 701(b)(2). But is it final? It has all of the hallmarks of APA finality that 
our opinions establish. Through the order, the EPA, ‘determined’ ‘rights or obligations.’”). Id.  
203. Id. at 1371. 
204. Id.; see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (quoting Bos. Marine 
Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)). 




209. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (The Administrative Procedure Act is limited 
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210. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. 1367 at 1372. 
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waited for the EPA to bring suit against them they accrued an addition-
al $75,000 (“$37,500 for violating the Act and another $37,500 for violat-
ing the compliance order”)213 in potential liability.214 Justice Alito in his 
concurrence stated, “in a nation that values due process, not to mention 
private property, such treatment is unthinkable.”215 Furthermore, the 
Court went on to state that “the remedy for denial of action that might 
be sought from one agency does not ordinarily provide an ‘adequate 
remedy’ for action already taken by another agency.”216 Thus, determin-
ing that suit brought under the APA, after a Corps’ permit is denied 
does not provide an “adequate remedy” for an action taken by EPA. 
Regarding the second issue, the Court concluded that the CWA’s 
statutory scheme did not preclude APA review because nothing in the 
CWA expressly precluded judicial review under the APA.217 APA’s pre-
sumption favoring judicial review may be overcome by interpreting the 
intent of the entire statute’s scheme.218  
The Government set forth four arguments attempting to explain 
why the statutory scheme of the CWA precludes review.219 First, “be-
cause Congress gave the EPA the choice between a judicial proceeding 
and an administrative [compliance order], it would undermine the Act to 
allow judicial review of [an order].”220 The Government further argued 
that an administrative compliance order provided a way of notifying re-
cipients of alleged violations and “quickly resolving issues through vol-
untary compliance.”221 However, the Court disagreed, holding that judi-
cial review is consistent with this function of notification and speedy 
resolution even when a recipient does not choose voluntary compliance, 
and that the CWA does not guarantee the EPA that an administrative 
compliance order is always the most effective tool.222 
Second, the Government argued that administrative “compliance 
orders are not self-executing,” rather, they “must be enforced by the 
agency in a . . . judicial action,” which suggested that Congress viewed 
an order “as a step in the deliberative process” rather than a sanction 
subject to judicial review.223 Again the Court disagreed, holding that the 
issuance of the compliance order was not just “a step in the deliberative 
process” because when the EPA denied the Sacketts’ hearing, the next 
                                                     
213. Id. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring). 
214. Id. at 1372. 
215. Id. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring). 
216. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372. 
217. Id. at 1372–74. 
218. Id. at 1373.  
219. Id. 
220. Id.  
221. Id. 
222. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1373. 
223. Id. 
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step in the process was to either comply with the EPA’s order or face a 
judicial action.224  
Third, the Government argued that Congress did not expressly 
provide for judicial review of compliance orders.225 This third argument 
was also dismissed because the Court reasoned that the cases the EPA 
relied upon were not analogous, and there was no suggestion that Con-
gress sought to “exclude compliance-order recipients from the Act’s re-
view scheme.”226 Finally, the Government warned the Court that the 
EPA would be less inclined to use administrative compliance orders if 
they were subject to judicial review.227 The Court disagreed with this 
argument as well holding that if the EPA would be less inclined to issue 
administrative compliance orders then such belief is “true for all agency 
actions subject[ ] to judicial review.”228 The Court further stated: 
[T]here is no reason to think that the Clean Water Act was 
uniquely designed to enable the strong-arming of regulated par-
ties into ‘voluntary compliance’ without the opportunity for judi-
cial review—even judicial review of the question whether the 
regulated party is within the EPA’s jurisdiction. Compliance or-
ders will remain an effective means of securing prompt volun-
tary compliance in those many cases where there is no substan-
tial basis to question their validity.229 
The Court concluded that the issued administrative compliance or-
der was final agency action and the CWA does not preclude judicial re-
view.230 Thus, the Sacketts were allowed to bring suit to challenge the 
EPA’s administrative compliance order under the APA. 231 The Ninth 
Circuit was reversed, resolving the circuit split between the Eleventh 
Circuit and the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits.232 The case 
was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s opinion.233 
VI. THE FUTURE OF EPA ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS: 
OPTIONS AND FINALITY 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sackett will have an impact on 
how EPA will enforce the CWA. The most certain impact of Sackett will 
be the judicial reviewability of CWA administrative compliance orders 
                                                     
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
226.  Id. at 1374. 
227. Id. 
228. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1374 (emphasis added). 
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issued by EPA.234 In light of the Court’s decision in Sackett, we are left 
with a two-part test to “determin[e] whether pre-enforcement review of 
EPA administrative action is allowed”: (1) is the administrative compli-
ance order a “final action” under the APA, and if so (2) “does the appli-
cable statute expressly preclude pre-enforcement . . . review” of such 
order?235 Practitioners should expect the court to examine whether a 
challenged agency action is final before examining whether the underly-
ing statutory scheme precludes judicial review. Thus, many believe the 
EPA will need to be selective about when it issues an administrative 
compliance order.236 
Despite the belief that there will be a positive impact against EPA, 
there are concerns within the industry regarding the Court’s decision. 
Specifically, many are concerned that judicial review will not occur im-
mediately, the process will be cumbersome for smaller parties like the 
Sacketts, and EPA and the Corps will exert more resources, as EPA will 
have to compile an administrative record for each issued administrative 
compliance order.237 However, the benefits afforded to property owners, 
such as a fair and equitable process, outweigh these concerns. Further-
more, obtaining judicial review adds rationality and equity to EPA’s en-
forcement scheme and is a significant step towards oversight of EPA. 
To better incorporate Sackett and to better administer and issue 
administrative compliance orders, EPA should consider two recommen-
dations: (1) continue issuing administrative compliance orders to recipi-
ents, however, in order to continue to allow EPA to respond quickly to 
ongoing violations, the orders must be altered so as to not trigger judi-
cial reviewability under the APA or (2) begin administering less formal 
communications such as NOVs as long as they don’t trigger the “final” 
action test as laid out in Bennett v. Spear. Either option will allow EPA 
to continue to abate and control pollution and ensure compliance with 
current and future environmental laws with the same determination, 
aggressiveness, and urgency as EPA does today. Such recommendations 
ensure everyday property owners are not run over and annihilated in 
the process, but also take into consideration what is fair and equitable. 
                                                     
234. Schiff, supra note 144, at 134. 
235. Leslie Garrett Allen & Chris Carron, Sackett v. EPA: Implications for Adminis-
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A. Recommendation One: The Continued Use of Administrative 
Compliance Orders 
Pondered questions after Sackett: Has Sackett had any impact on 
EPA’s decision to issue or not issue administrative compliance orders? 
How many administrative compliance orders have been issued? How 
does the data compare to 2011? The empirical data indicate that Sackett 
may have had some influence. Specifically, in 2013, EPA issued 873 ad-
ministrative compliance orders under all major environmental stat-
utes.238 
 
Enforcement Annual Result Numbers at a Glance for Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 
Civil Enforcement and Compliance Activities239 
Referrals of Civil Judicial Enforcement Cases to Department of 
Justice (DOJ)  
138 
Supplemental Referrals of Civil Judicial Enforcement Cases to 
DOJ  
25 
Civil Judicial Complaints Filed with Court  137 
Civil Judicial Enforcement Case Conclusions  176 
Administrative Penalty Order Complaints  1,407 
Final Administrative Penalty Orders  1,440 
Administrative Compliance Orders  873 
Cases with Supplemental Environmental Projects  110 
Inspections/Evaluations  18,000 
 
In 2011, EPA issued 1,324 administrative compliance orders.240 In 
2013, EPA issued 451 fewer administrative compliance orders under its 
enforcement scheme than it issued in 2011.241 EPA officials have not 
directly and definitively stated that they issued fewer administrative 
compliance orders due to the Sackett decision. However, it is hard not to 
believe that the Court’s decision in Sackett was the reason why 35% 
fewer administrative compliance orders were issued in 2013. Although 
many scholars, practitioners, and industry groups believed the Sackett 
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decision was the death knell for administrative compliance orders, EPA 
is clearly issuing administrative compliance orders in many contexts. 
Therefore, although 35% is very significant, it appears EPA is not facing 
as grim of a future as what many believed.  
Although the data indicates fewer administrative compliance or-
ders have been issued in 2013, EPA has made it clear it will continue to 
issue administrative compliance orders. Mark Pollins, a top EPA official 
indicated as much during an American Law Institute–American Bar 
Association event on May 3, 2012.242 Pollins stated that the Sackett de-
cision would have very little effect on how EPA enforces the CWA.243 
Additionally, Pollins indicated that EPA would continue to use adminis-
trative compliance orders under the CWA, despite the Court’s ruling.244 
When asked “What’s available after Sackett?” Pollins responded, “Pretty 
much everything that was available before Sackett . . . internally it’s the 
same old, same old.”245 Pollins further stated that the Court’s ruling in 
Sackett did not limit EPA’s authority to issue administrative compliance 
orders nor did it limit their applicability as the “[Supreme Court] did not 
hold the compliance order was substantially deficient.”246 
On March 21, 2013, EPA issued a Memorandum explaining that 
following the Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency decision EPA will begin 
adding language to administrative compliance orders issued under the 
CWA to ensure that recipients of such orders are aware of their oppor-
tunity to seek pre-enforcement judicial review.247 Specifically, the lan-
guage states “Respondent may seek federal judicial review of the Order 
pursuant to Chapter 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 
701-706.248 However, the agency “may need to take extra steps to ensure 
that its decision is supported by a comprehensive administrative record 
that allows the order to withstand judicial review.”249 Informing the re-
cipient of their right to seek pre-enforcement judicial review is a step 
forward but only one step. 
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In order for EPA to continue to issue administrative compliance or-
ders effectively, the orders must not be a “final” agency action and must 
not trigger judicial review under the APA. Thus, although EPA has al-
tered administrative compliance orders to provide awareness of pre-
enforcement judicial review, administrative compliance orders must still 
be altered further. As previously discussed “final” agency action is judi-
cially reviewable under the APA when the action: (1) “mark[s] the ‘con-
summation’ of the agency’s decision-making process,” and (2) is “one by 
which ‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ or from which ‘legal 
consequences will flow.’”250 Thus for proper implementation of option 
one, EPA must take two necessary actions to ensure administrative 
compliance orders do not trigger judicial reviewability under the APA. 
First, EPA will need to guarantee notice and an opportunity to be 
heard prior to assessing penalties. “[A]dministrative agencies must en-
gage in individualized decision-making and observe additional proce-
dural due process guarantees . . . [such as], notice and the opportunity 
to be heard.”251 Under this option, EPA will be required to provide notice 
to the recipient of the alleged violation and an informal hearing where 
the recipient can explain their actions and gain more information prior 
to assessing penalties. Upon doing so, the administrative compliance 
order will not mark the consummation of EPA’s decision-making thus, 
circumventing the first prong of the final agency action test. 
Second, EPA will need to refrain from exposing the recipient or al-
leged violator to penalties for violating the applicable statute, and im-
posing upon the recipient an obligation to restore their property in ac-
cordance with EPA’s orders until a hearing has been conducted. Con-
ducting an actual hearing will ensure that the recipient’s rights and ob-
ligations are not determined until the recipient has had an opportunity 
to be heard. Upon doing so, EPA will avoid the second prong of the final 
agency action test. 
Both actions just described rest on one necessary requirement—an 
actual, direct, and meaningful public hearing. Currently, EPA obeys the 
CWA enforcement statute, 33 U.S.C. § 1319, however, upon a closer in-
spection, as in Sackett, it is clear EPA has not been properly following 
through with its obligations.252 It is safe to say EPA provides notice to 
alleged violators through means such as administrative compliance or-
ders and an opportunity to be heard as set forth by the statute, however 
EPA repeatedly denies recipients an actual, direct, and meaningful 
hearing where the recipient can explain their actions and ask questions 
in order to better understand the agency’s actions, requirements, and 
reasons behind the alleged violation.253 It would seem EPA finds it easi-
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er and more time efficient to deny recipients a hearing, move on to the 
next step in the enforcement process—assessing penalties—and eventu-
ally move on to the next case.254 It is absolutely necessary that EPA take 
that extra step and refrain from denying recipients direct public hear-
ings in order to first, fully comply with 33 U.S.C. § 1319 and second, to 
better provide a fair and equitable determination that is expected under 
the law. Only then, will EPA be able to circumvent the entire final agen-
cy action test as set forth in Bennett v. Spear and restated by the Court. 
It could appear that the actions—ensuring notice and an actual op-
portunity to be heard and refraining from exposing recipients to penal-
ties prior to conducting an actual direct hearing—may be difficult for 
EPA to implement because such actions are not prevalent within EPA, 
however they are not impossible and conversely are realistic so long as 
EPA puts in the necessary time. Upon implementation, EPA can contin-
ue to issue administrative compliance orders without fear that they will 
be reviewed under the APA. This will take more time and effort on 
EPA’s behalf, yet compared to the time spent litigating such matters in 
court, such time will be minimal and considered well spent. 
Although Pollins stated on behalf of the agency that EPA will con-
tinue to issue administrative compliance orders,255 such orders are not 
the only tool at EPA’s disposal or at its discretional use. Specifically, 
EPA may use less formal means of communication such as NOVs. 
Therefore, the second option recommended by this article suggests EPA 
retire administrative compliance orders and begin using this informal 
type of communication. 
B. Recommendation Two – Notice of Violation 
Justice Scalia foreshadowed during oral argument in Sackett that 
EPA may “try to issue parties warnings that cannot be enforced,” notify 
recipients of their potential violation, and inform recipients of the poten-
tial monetary penalties they face if they do not comply. 256  Doing so 
would not implicate judicial review because the actions would not be 
final agency actions or impose any penalties. NOVs fall into this warn-
ing category.257 However, to date there is limited information available 
on this type of warning. 
The Clean Air Act (CAA) issues NOVs to avoid judicial review.258 
Section 7413(a)(1) of the CAA provides that “EPA may issue a notice of 
violation when the Administrator finds that any person has violated or 
is in violation of any requirement or prohibition of an implementation 
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plan or permit.”259 After a thirty-day grace period has expired, the EPA 
may pursue other enforcement options such as issuing an administra-
tive compliance order, imposing an administrative penalty, or bringing a 
civil action.260 Additionally, the EPA states on its website that NOVs are 
just one step in the EPA’s investigation and enforcement statutes and 
regulations.261 EPA further indicated that 
A[n] NOV notifies the recipient that EPA believes the recipient 
committed one or more violations and provides instructions for 
coming into compliance. NOVs typically offer an opportunity for 
the recipient to discuss their actions, including efforts to 
achieve compliance. NOVs are not a final EPA determination 
that a violation has occurred. EPA considers all appropriate in-
formation to determine the final enforcement response.262 
Essentially, NOVs inform an alleged violator of a suspected viola-
tion they have committed and lay out potential enforcement options at-
tempting to convince the alleged violator to work with EPA in order to 
come into compliance.263 Finally, NOVs provide for an opportunity to 
meet, and do not impose penalties.264 Thus, it is clear NOVs are not final 
agency action and thus are not subject to judicial review. NOVs do not 
trigger the final agency action test in Bennett v. Spear because NOVs do 
not mark the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process as 
NOVs are just one step of many in the EPA’s investigation and they 
provide an opportunity for the recipient to discuss their actions. Addi-
tionally, the rights or obligations of the recipient have not been deter-
mined and legal consequences do not flow therefrom. 
Therefore, because NOVs do not trigger the final agency action test 
EPA may administer them in place of administrative compliance orders 
all the while still satisfying their enforcement obligations—ceasing the 
discharge of harmful pollutants—and furthering their main objective of 
abating and controlling pollution and providing recipients an opportuni-
ty to be heard in a fair and equitable way. 
Despite industry concerns surrounding the Sackett decision, both 
recommendations are advantageous to EPA and to property owners eve-
rywhere. Specifically, property owners are afforded a fair and equitable 
adjudication as required by the law and EPA is able to issue administra-
tive compliance orders without fear they will be judicially reviewable 
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and thus, it will avoid expensive litigating costs in the long run. There-
fore, either recommendation would be suitable for EPA to implement. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sackett is a small although im-
portant step in providing a more thorough oversight of EPA, and ensur-
ing recipients are afforded notice and an actual, direct, and meaningful 
opportunity to be heard as required by law. Over time, the hope is the 
decision will improve compliance and further EPA’s goals of protecting 
the environment in which we live. However, the implementation of ei-
ther recommendation—the continued use of administrative compliance 
orders or NOVs—goes one step further by providing EPA with the abil-
ity to continue to utilize enforcement mechanisms without concern of 
judicial review and extensive litigating costs. 
Moreover, it is evident Sackett has influenced EPA’s issuance of 
administrative compliance orders as indicated from the collected empiri-
cal data. However, it appears that EPA is not facing as grim a future as 
many believed, and administrative compliance orders will continue to be 
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